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Health Insurance Mega-Mergers 
Jacqueline C. Lien* 
INTRODUCTION 
2015 marked the beginning of a long battle for two major health 
insurance companies.  On July 3, 2015, health insurance giant and third 
largest health insurance company by revenue, Aetna, announced that it 
entered into an agreement to acquire the fifth largest health insurance 
company, Humana, for $37 billion.1  Following a similar timeline, on July 
24, 2015, second largest, Anthem, negotiated an even bigger merger with 
Cigna, the fourth largest, for $54.2 billion.2  Officials from all four 
companies lauded the benefits of the mergers, stating that the synergies 
between the respective companies would result in enhanced health care 
access, quality, and affordability for consumers, as well as transform the 
market to a more “consumerfocused marketplace.”3  However, many, 
including the Department of Justice, expressed concerns about the potential 
impact the proposed megamergers would have on competition in the 
health insurance industry.  On July 21, 2016, the Department of Justice 
launched a suit to block Aetna’s acquisition of Humana, as well as 
Anthem’s acquisition of Cigna, citing concerns that the mergers would 
harm competition by reducing the number of large, national health insurers 
from five to three.4 
In the midst of it all, Aetna’s CEO, Mark Bertolini, wrote to the 
Department of Justice threatening that if the Department failed to approve 
 
 *  Jacqueline C. Lien, J.D. 2018 at University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
 1. Press Release, Aetna, Inc., Aetna to Acquire Humana for $37 Billion, Combines Entity to 
Drive ConsumerFocused, HighValue Health Care, (July 3, 2015). 
 2. Ankur Banerjee & Ransdell Pierson, Anthem to buy Cigna, creating biggest U.S. Health 
Insurer, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cigna-m-a-anthem-idUSKCN0PY 
12B20150724 [https://perma.cc/SK7L-F29V]. 
 3. Supra note 2; see also Aetna to acquire Humana, combined entity to drive consumer-focused, 
high-value health care, ANTHEM (Aug. 24, 2015), https://news.aetna.com/2015/08/aetna-to-acquire-
humana/ [https://perma.cc/NMX7-GMHZ]. 
 4. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department and State Attorneys General Sue to 
Block Anthem’s Acquisition of Cigna, Aetna’s Acquisition of Humana (July 21, 2016). 
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of the merger, Aetna would pull out of the Obamacare exchanges.5  The 
Department persisted and five months later, Aetna followed through with 
its threat withdrawing from markets in seventeen counties in Florida, 
Georgia, and Missouri.6  Taking Aetna’s lead, Humana announced that 
starting in 2018, they would no longer offer health insurance plans in the 
state marketplace exchanges.7  A few months later, Anthem followed suit 
stating that it would need to “assess the longterm viability of [its] 
exchange footprint.”8 
In an attempt to win over the new administration, Anthem stated its 
support for the American Health Care Act and financially backed a number 
of political support groups that have some influence over the proposed 
merger. During their pursuit, Anthem remained relentless, even when faced 
with several obstaclesboth internally and judicially.  Their efforts to 
merge with Cigna were not only aggressive but politically transparent.  
Although both the mergers eventually failed,9 the tactics Aetna and Anthem 
used to pursue their acquisitions raised significant concerns about their 
market power. Anthem and Aetna’s behavior in their pursuit of their 
respective mergers demonstrates that these health insurance companies 
have become so big and powerful that they are willing to openly threaten a 
federal agency that was currently investigating them for anticompetitive 
behavior.  The time has come for the federal government to take bold steps 
to maintain some level of competition and fairness in the marketplace to 
protect consumers. 
This note analyzes the role of political gaming as it relates to mergers 
and acquisitions of major health insurance companies and how it can 
negatively impact consumers.  More specifically, this note focuses on the 
deceptive tactics that Aetna and Anthem displayed in their pursuit of their 
respective acquisitions.  Additionally, this note explains why the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice must investigate these 
 
 5. Scott Hensley, Aetna CEO To Justice Department: Block Our Deal and We’ll Drop Out of 
Obamacare, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Aug 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/17/ 
490202346/aetna-ceo-to-justice-department-block-our-deal-and-well-drop-out-of-exchanges [https:// 
perma.cc/NXH3-CDW2]. 
 6. United States v. Aetna Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8409, 1992 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2017). 
 7. Reed Abelson, Humana Plans to Pull Out of Obamacare’s Insurance Exchanges. N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/health/humana-plans-to-pull-out-of-obamacares-
insurance-exchanges.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6HW4-NJKL]. 
 8. Shelby Livingston, Anthem Warns of ACA Exchange Retreat In 2018, MODERN HEALTHCARE 
(Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161102/NEWS/161109978 [https://perma. 
cc/YJU2-5UMV]. 
 9. Ana Mulero, Anthem terminates Cigna merger, Healthcare Dive (May 12, 2017), http:// 
www.healthcaredive.com/news/breaking-anthem-terminates-cigna-merger/442637/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4WPM-M2HY]; see also, Rebecca Hersher, Aetna And Humana Call Off Merger After Court Decision, 
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/14/515167491 
/aetna-and-humana-call-off-merger-after-court-decision [https://perma.cc/N26S-SKZR]. 
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tactics in order to protect competition, prevent further market 
consolidation, and ensure protection against big corporate insurance.  
Further, this note explains how transitioning to a single payer system may 
resolve the issues that stem from the proposed mega-mergers. 
First, this note provides background information on the Aetna and 
Anthem mergers.  Then, Part I examines the negative impacts of health 
insurance megamergers.  Part II discusses the McCarranFerguson Act 
and whether Aetna and Anthem are exempt from all federal regulation, 
including federal antitrust regulation.  Part III analyzes three separate 
bodies of federal antitrust regulation: the Clayton Act, The Sherman Act, 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Because the courts already 
reviewed the mergers as a whole, Part III addresses whether the tactics that 
Aetna and Anthem employed during their merger attempts violated those 
laws, rather than whether the mergers themselves did.  Finally, Part IV 
argues that shifting from our current health insurance model to a single 
payer system or hybrid system would drastically decrease the health 
insurance companies’ ability to use their political power to their advantage. 
BACKGROUND 
AETNAHUMANA 
In mid-2015, Aetna negotiated a merger with Humana for $37 
billion.10  In anticipation of potential litigation, Aetna CEO Mark Bertolini 
issued a letter to the Department of Justice11 outlining Aetna’s intent to 
withdraw its participation in the exchanges if the Department of Justice 
continued the suit to enjoin the merger with Humana.12  Aetna claimed that 
the company was losing money from operating on the exchanges.13  The 
company also claimed that the costs of litigation would be too much of a 
financial burden for Aetna to bear.14  Thus, the merger would need to 
succeed, otherwise they could no longer continue to turn a profit while still 
participating in the exchanges.15  Many, including the court, considered the 
letter to be a threat to the Department of Justice.16  The court itself said, 
 
 10. Chad Bray & Reed Abelson, Aetna Agrees to Acquire Humana for $37 Billion in Cash and 
Stock, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/business/ deal 
book/aetna-agrees-to-acquire-humana-for-37-billion-in-cash-and-stock.html [https://perma.cc/5EEE-52 
UP]. 
 11. Supra, note 6. 
 12. Letter from Mark Bertolini, CEO, Aetna Inc., to Dep’t. of Justice (July 5, 2016) (accessed at 
big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/AetnaDOJletter.pdf). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Supra note 6, at 211; see also Hensley, supra note 5; see also  Zachary Tracer, Aetna 
Threatened to Quit Obamacare If Deal Blocked by U.S., BLOOMBERG (Aug 17, 2016); see also 
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“Aetna . . . was willing to threaten to limit its participation in the 
exchanges” and later addressed their withdrawal from 17 counties as Aetna 
following through with their threat.17 An excerpt from the letter follows 
below: 
 
Our analysis to date makes clear that if the deal were challenged 
and/or blocked we would need to take immediate actions to mitigate 
public exchange and ACA small group losses.  Specifically, if the DOJ 
sues to enjoin the transaction, we will immediately take action to reduce 
our 2017 exchange footprint.  We currently plan, as part of our strategy 
following the acquisition, to expand from 15 states in 2016 to 20 states in 
2017. However, if we are in the midst of litigation over the Humana 
transaction, given the risks described above, we will not be able to 
expand to the five additional states. In addition, we would also withdraw 
from at least five additional states where generating a market return 
would take too long for us to justify, given the costs associated with a 
potential breakup of the transaction. In other words, instead of expanding 
to 20 states next year, we would reduce our presence to no more than 10 
states. We also would not be in a position to provide assistance to failing 
cooperative exchanges as we did in Iowa recently.18 
 
After some consideration, the Department of Justice promptly 
launched an antitrust case against Aetna in response to the proposed 
merger, despite Aetna’s threat to pull out of the exchanges.19  Shortly after, 
Aetna followed through with their threats, announcing that it would not 
offer plans on the exchanges in 2017 in eleven of the fifteen states where 
they had participated in 2016.20 
ANTHEMCIGNA 
On February 8, 2017, the District Court determined that the proposed 
merger between Anthem and Cigna would substantially lessen competition 
and result in higher premiums and fewer choices in the large employer 
group market.21  During the court proceedings, discovery revealed tensions 
between the two health insurance giants.22  This included a letter that 
 
Jonathan Cohn & Jeffrey Young, Aetna CEO Threatened Obamacare Pullout If Feds Opposed Humana 
Merger, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2016). 
 17. Supra note 6, at 211,  
 18. Infra note 35. 
 19. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department and State Attorneys General Sue to Block Anthem’s 
Acquisition of Cigna, Aetna’s Acquisition of Humana, (July 21, 2016); see also supra note 6. 
 20. Supra note 6, at 207 
 21. Supra note 6, at 218. 
 22. Jimmy Hoover, Transcripts In Anthem-Cigna Trial Show Merger Tension, LAW360 (Nov. 29, 
2016), https://www.law360.com/health/articles/866682/transcripts-in-anthem-cigna-trial-show-merger-
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Anthem CEO Joseph Swedish sent to Cigna CEO David Cordani, in which 
Swedish called the implementation of the integration “unacceptable.”23 
Discovery also revealed communications from an Anthem employee’s 
email indicating that Anthem established an Anthemonly team to proceed 
with the integration efforts “without Cigna’s knowledge or support” for a 
number of merger issues.24  DOJ attorney Scott Fitzgerald also highlighted 
a letter from the chairman of Cigna’s board of directors, which accused 
Anthem of “taking actions that erode[d], rather than maximize[d], the value 
to be achieved from the transaction.”25  Shortly after the District Court’s 
ruling, Cigna announced that had exercised its right to terminate the 
proposed merger with Anthem, stating that they believed that “the 
transaction cannot and will not achieve regulatory approval and that 
terminating the agreement is in the best interest of Cigna’s shareholders.”26  
Cigna promptly filed a lawsuit against Anthem in the Delaware Chancery 
Court to effect the termination and to seek $13 billion in damages in 
addition to the $1.85 billion breakup fee as stipulated in the merger 
agreement.27 
Under the agreement, both Anthem and Cigna have the right to 
terminate the agreement if the merger is not consummated by January 31, 
2017, subject to extension to April 30, 2017.28  Shortly after the Delaware 
Chancery Court filing, Anthem released a statement claiming that “Cigna’s 
lawsuit and purported termination is the next step in Cigna’s campaign to 
sabotage the merger and to try to deflect attention from its repeated willful 
breaches of the Merger Agreement in support of such effort.”29  Anthem 
then filed a suit against Cigna seeking a temporary restraining order to 
enjoin Cigna from terminating the merger Agreement.30  Despite the 
District Court’s ruling, the tensions between Anthem and Cigna, and the 
Chancery Court case, Anthem maintained that it believed that there was 
sufficient time and “a viable path forward” to complete the merger, which 




 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Cigna Corporation, Cigna Terminates Merger Agreement With Anthem, (Feb. 14 2017), 
https://www.cigna.com/newsroom/news-releases/2017/cigna-terminates-merger-agreement-with-anthem 
[https://perma.cc/L4K9-AX3M]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Merger Agreement, Anthem, Inc., Form 8-K, Item 1.01 (July 27, 2015). 
 29. Anthem, Inc., Anthem Files Suit Against Cigna Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order to 
Enjoin Cigna from Terminating the Merger Agreement, Specific Performance Compelling Cigna to 
Comply with the Merger Agreement and Damages, Press Release (Feb. 15, 2017). 
 30. Id. 
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$2 billion in medical costs.31 
Moreover, President Trump recently nominated Makan Delrahim to 
the Department of Justice to serve as an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Antitrust Division.32  Delrahim is an attorney who previously represented 
Anthem during his time in private practice and even went on to lobby 
Congress on behalf of Anthem on antitrust related issues regarding their 
merger with Cigna.33  Delrahim’s appointment could have resulted in a 
favorable outcome for Anthem.  Court documents showed that Anthem was 
confident that the merger was still viable under a new DOJ.34  Anthem 
publically endorsed the American Health Care Act, which is proposed to 
replace the Affordable Care Act.35  Anthem even went as far as to donate 
$460,000 to groups supporting the election campaigns of certain governors 
and state attorneys general.36  These included the Republican Governors 
Association and the Democratic Governors Association.37  In many states, 
governors appoint the insurance commissioners, who are responsible for 
reviewing proposed mergers like the AnthemCigna merger.38  Anthem’s 
political transparency and unwavering legal pursuit demonstrated the 
lengths that they were willing to go to successfully acquire Cigna. 
I. THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF  
HEALTH INSURANCE MEGAMERGERS 
 
Large health insurance companies like Aetna and Anthem have long 
lauded the benefits of mergers like the ones they proposed.  Aetna claimed 
that the merger would allow them to offer “a broad choice of affordable, 
consumer-centric health care products, [help] to constrain cost growth, 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Melissa Lipman, Trump Names Makan Delrahim As DOJ Antitrust Chief, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 
2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/902548/trump-names-makan-delrahim-as-doj-antitrust-chief. 
 33. Shelby Livingston, Could Trump’s Top DOJ Antitrust Pick Help Seal the Anthem-Cigna 
Deal?, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170328/ 
NEWS/170329919 [https://perma.cc/79Z4-E2NB]. 
 34. Shelby Livingston, Anthem sees Trump’s DOJ as its Wingman, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 
25, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170225/MAGAZINE/302259918 [https://per 
ma.cc/BD32-5JRF]. 
 35. Virgil Dickson, Anthem Backs GOP’S Obamacare Replacement, MODERN HEALTHCARE 
(Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170310/NEWS/170319992 [https://per 
ma.cc/W458-XVLE]. 
 36. David Sirota, Anthem-Cigna Deal: Seeking Merger Approval, Anthem Makes Major 
Donations to State Political Groups, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
political-capital/anthem-cigna-deal-seeking-merger-approval-anthem-makes-major-donations-state 
[https://perma.cc/89AC-MQA2]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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improve health outcomes, and promote wellness.”39  Aetna also claimed 
that the merger would provide them with the “enhanced ability to work 
with providers and create value-based payment agreements” that would 
result in better care to the consumers.40 Anthem CEO Joseph Swedish 
issued similar sentiments in a press release announcing the merger with 
Cigna.41 
However, health insurance markets in the United States are already 
highly concentrated.  In a study done by the American Medical Association 
(AMA), researchers found that seventy-two percent of the healthcare 
markets surveyed were highly concentrated according to the Herfindal-
Hirschman Index (HHI).42  Mergers within markets that are already highly 
concentrated are presumptively illegal and raise significant antitrust 
concerns, including risks of increased prices and reductions in the number 
of services available.43  Furthermore, while health insurance companies 
may suggest that concentration is not enough to bar mergers because rival 
insurers can enter into markets, “years of DOJ enforcement actions have 
shown that entry barriers into health insurer markets are substantial.”44  
This section will highlight some of the negative impacts of health insurance 
megamergers.  If left unchecked, companies like Aetna and Anthem who 
already have such a substantial share of the market could use their political 
lobbying power to eliminate competition and make these impacts a reality 
to the detriment of the consumers. 
 
 39. Aetna, Inc., Aetna to Acquire Humana for $37 Billion, Combined Entity to Drive Consumer-
Focused, High-Value Health Care, Press Release (July 3, 2015), http://www.businesswire. 
com/news/home/20150702005935/en/Aetna-Acquire-Humana-37-Billion-Combined-Entity#.VZYp 
MeTD9OI [https://perma.cc/9TD2-J7J8]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Anthem, Inc., Anthem Announces Definitive Agreement to Acquire Cigna Corporation, BUS. 
WIRE (July 24, 2015), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150724005167/en/Anthem-Announ 
ces-Definitive-Agreement-Acquire-Cigna-Corporation [https://perma.cc/NR62-ARVP]. 
 42. See David W. Emmons & Jose R. Guardado, Competition In Health Insurance: A 
Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets, AM. MED. ASSOC. (2014).  The Herfindal-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) is used to measure market concentration.  “The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of 
each firm competing in the market and summing the resulting numbers.”  The HHI factors in the 
relative size distribution of the firms in a market.  The HHI is frequently used by the DOJ and FTC. 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index, [https://perma.cc/9QLJ-2M29]. 
 43. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines at § 5.3 
(Aug. 19, 2010). 
 44. David Balto & James Kovacs, Health Insurane Merger Frenzy: Why DOJ Must Just say ‘No’, 
LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/683500/health-insurance-merger-frenzy-
why-doj-must-just-say-no; see, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Aetna Inc. and Prudential Insurance 
Co. of Am., No. 3-99CV 1398-H (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1999) (finding that it was unlikely that new 
insurers would enter and compete with the newly formed Aetna/Prudential in Houston and Dallas 
“because of the costs and difficulties of doing so”). 
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A.  INCREASED NEGOTIATION POWER 
The idea is simple enough: when health insurance companies merge, 
they leverage their combined market power and resources when negotiating 
with health care providers, leading to cost savings and improved quality.  
While large health insurance companies claim that mergers amongst 
themselves allow them to gain more leverage to negotiate with providers at 
the benefit of the consumer, Thomas Greaney’s Sumo Wrestler theory 
suggests otherwise.  His theory suggests that when two dominant entities 
like a large-scale health care provider and a national health insurance 
company come together to negotiate, what is likely to result is a 
“handshake rather than an honest negotiation.”45  That is, instead of using 
their market power to negotiate a deal to benefit consumers, the two entities 
are more likely to negotiate a deal that benefits themselves. Precedent 
supports Greaney’s theory.  In West Penn Allegheny v. UPMC and 
Highmark, the dominant insurer in the Pittsburg area, Highmark, reached 
an agreement with the largest health system, University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center (UPMC).46  The agreement protected the insurer against 
competition and harmed the health system’s only hospital rival, West 
Penn.47  Even more notable, executives of Partners HealthCare, the 
dominant hospital system in Massachusetts, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts, a dominant insurer, negotiated an agreement that would 
make insurance more expensive statewide.48  The agreement stipulated that 
Blue Cross would increase insurance payments to Partners’ doctors and 
hospitals.49  In return, Partners would push other insurers to pay more for 
services rendered.50  This agreement, known as a most favored nations 
provision, would ensure that all major insurers would face millions in cost 
increases by forcing them to pay more to compete with Blue Cross.51  To 
avoid potential antitrust violations, Partners and Blue Cross effectuated the 
agreement with a literal handshake, being sure not to leave a paper trail.52  
Agreements like these ultimately hurt the consumers.  Even when the 
dominant player is successful in bargaining with providers, it has little 
 
 45. Thomas Greaney, New Health Care Symposium: Dubious Health Care Merger Justifications 
– The Sumo Wrestler and “Government Made Me Do It” Defenses, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 24, 
2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/24/dubious-health-care-merger-justifications-the-sumo-
wrestler-and-government-made-me-do-it-defenses/ [http://perma.cc/49M3-HXXX]. 
 46. Id.; see also Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 47. Greaney, supra note 45. 
 48. Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, et al., A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2008), https://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/28/handshake-that-
made-healthcare-history/QiWbywqb8olJsA3IZ11o1H/story.html [https://perma.cc/YT3N-LYQS]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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incentive to pass the savings on to its policy holders.53  Further, even if the 
negotiations lowered rates for consumers, it would likely “lead to a 
reduction in the quantity or degradation in the quality of physician 
services.”54 
Former policy director of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal 
Trade Commission, David Balto, suggested that the mergers would lead to 
an increase in monopsony power.55  Monopsony power is “the power to 
reduce reimbursement for health care providers.”56  Monopsony power 
gives health insurers a bigger bargaining chip against health care providers 
in terms of controlling the market in their favor (i.e., more restricted 
networks, contrived shortages of medical care,57 etc.).  While health 
insurers contend that increased monopsony power will lead to lower prices 
for consumers, the reality is that health insurance providers like Anthem, 
Aetna, Cigna, and Humana already have huge negotiating power.  Balto 
suggests that rather than lowering premiums, the post-merger monopsony 
power will result in reduced “availability and affordability of health 
insurance for millions of consumers.”58  Further, reducing reimbursement 
for health care providers can harm several provider markets and lead to 
shortages of health care providers and less service for patients.59  According 
to the American Association of Family Practitioners, increased monopsony 
power will likely lead to more restricted networks, which “would only be 
exacerbated if a single insurer held greater influence over any potential 
market, state, or regionpotentially separating patients from their 
physicians and community hospitals.”60  Thus, the potential benefit of 
increased negotiation power as a result of a megamerger is unlikely to 
confer to the consumers. 
Increased negotiation power is not limited to negotiations with 
providers.  As demonstrated by the health insurance mega-mergers, larger 
companies will likely have more political lobbying power.  Because of 
their substantial share of the market and their negotiation power, both 
 
 53. Greaney, supra note 45; see also Leemore Dafny,  Mark Duggan &Subramaniam  
Ramanarayanan, Paying a Premium on your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance 
Industry, http://www.bu.edu/sph/files/2010/10/Dafny-Duggan-Ramanarayanan.pdf. 
 54. Leemore Dafny, Mark Duggan, & Subramaniam Ramanarayanan, Paying a Premium on Your 
Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161, 1183 (2012). 
 55. David Balto & James Kovacs, Health Insurance Merger Frenzy: Why DOJ Must Just say 
‘No’, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/683500/health-insurance-merger-fren 
zy-why-doj-must-just-say-no [https://perma.cc/TM5U-MP8M]. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Laurie J. Bates & Rexford E. Santerre, Do health insurers possess monopsony power in the 
hospital services industry?, 8 INTL. J. OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND ECON. 1, 2 (2008). 
 58. Balto & Kovacs, supra note 55, citing Letter from Reid Blackwelder, Board Chair, AAFP, to 
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, FTC (June 4, 2015), available at http://goo.gl/vk4lHM. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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Aetna and Humana were emboldened to attempt to negotiate with the 
federal government.  Additionally, because of the financial resources they 
have, both companies were able to throw their support behind key political 
players that would be able to make political decisions to benefit their 
companies.  Although these health insurance companies claim that 
increased negotiation power is beneficial to the consumers, it is more than 
likely that the companies will use it for their own financial gain to the 
detriment of the consumers. 
B.  COST INCREASE OF HEALTH CARE PREMIUMS 
While there is evidence that suggests that larger insurers have the 
ability to pay providers less,61 research has shown that health insurance 
mergers often result in premium increases for consumers.62  In a study done 
on the effect of health insurance mergers on policy premiums, researchers 
found that exchange premiums are responsive to competition.63  The study 
found that when insurance markets become more concentrated, premiums 
are highly likely to increase, rather than decrease like the health insurance 
companies claim.64 
Another study conducted by the American Medical Association 
(AMA) found that physicians who practice in areas with low competition 
tended to charge more for office visits than physicians who practiced in 
areas with high competition.65  This further demonstrates that decreased 
competition negatively impacts consumers by increasing costs.  Without an 
increase in quality or any other reasonable justification, concentration alone 
should not determine the price of health care. 
C.  QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ON POLICIES UNLIKELY 
Decreased competition also negatively impacts consumers by reducing 
the incentive to improve the quality of care.  The AMA suggested that if 
the mergers were successful, the health insurance companies would feel 
less pressure to offer broader networks to compete for members or respond 
 
 61. Glenn A. Melnick,  Yu-Chu Shen, &  Vivian Yaling Wu, The Increased Concentration Of 
Health Plan Markets Can Benefit Consumers Through Lower Hospital Prices, 30 HEATH AFFAIRS, 
1728, 1728–33 (2011). 
 62. Leemore S. Dafny, The Risks of Health Insurance Company Mergers, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep. 
24, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/09/the-risks-of-health-insurance-company-mergers [https://perma.cc/ 
J5XT-3QWE]. 
 63. Leemore S. Dafny, Jonathan Gruber, & Christopher Ody, More Insurers Lower Premiums, 
AM. J. OF HEALTH ECON. (2015), 5378, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/ 
10.1162/AJHE_a_00003. 
 64. Id.; see also Dafny, supra note 62; Leemore Dafny, “Health Insurance Industry 
Consolidation: What Do We Know From the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the ACA, and What Should 
We Ask?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 22, 2015, at 10. 
 65. Infra note 78. 
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to the access needs of patients.66  Thus, patients would likely find 
themselves forced to go to out-of-network providers to receive care,67 
which shifts the costs from the insurer to the seemingly insuredresulting 
in a cost savings for the insurance companies. 
Some research has shown that competition can affect the quality of 
health plans.  In a study done in 2003 on consumer surplus relating to the 
Medicare HMO program, researchers found that “all other facts being 
equal, the more rivals in a geographic area, the greater the availability of 
prescription drug benefits.”68  Thus, health insurance companies like Aetna, 
Humana, Anthem, and Cigna should not be allowed to merge because they 
will not feel obligated to improve quality, which is a key component in 
maintaining competition. 
D. INCREASED INNOVATION UNLIKELY 
Innovation is essential to fostering competition in the marketplace. 
The American Hospital Association (AHA) contends that megamergers 
are likely to result in decreased innovation.69  The AMA mirrored that 
sentiment finding that contrary to the health insurers’ claims that the 
mergers will enable them to innovate patient care, “large insurers are not 
more likely to implement the innovative payment and care management 
programs that benefit employers and individual patients.”70  In fact, 
“concerted delivery system reform efforts have tended to emerge from 
other sources, such as provider systems . . . and non-national payers,” not 
commercial health insurers.71  Since innovation is a key component in 
keeping the marketplace competitive, health insurance megamergers 
could pose a major threat to competition in the health insurance industry. 
Although large health insurance companies laud the benefits of 
megamergers, the mergers can have negative impacts on consumers to the 
benefit of the companies, including higher costs and decreased quality of 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Dafney, supra note 62, citing Robert Town & Su Liu, The Welfare Impact of Medicare 
HMOs,  34 RAND J. OF ECON. (2003) 4.  This study was done prior to the enactment of Medicare Part 
D, which funded drug benefits for nearly all Medicare enrollees. 
 69. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Hospital Association, No. 17-5024, https://assets.doc 
umentcloud.org/documents/3519060/American-Hospital-Association.pdf. 
 70. American Medical Association, The Anthem-CIGNA and Aetna-Humana Mergers: Putting 
Profits Ahead of Patients, 3, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/Insurance-
Merger-Myth-Reality.pdf. 
 71. American Medical Association, The Anthem-CIGNA and Aetna-Humana Mergers: Putting 
Profits Ahead of Patients, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/Insurance-Merg 
er-Myth-Reality.pdf citing Dafny, “Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: What Do We Know From 
the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the ACA, and What Should We Ask?” Testimony before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 22, 2015, at 6. 
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premiums.  Mega-mergers such as Anthem-Cigna and Aetna-Humana have 
to potential to threaten competition and harm the consumers, which is why 
the government must intervene in order to protect competition in the health 
insurance market. 
II. THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE 
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
 
Despite the health insurance industry being one of the largest and most 
lucrative industries in the United States, the McCarran-Ferguson Act might 
allow health insurance companies to try to avoid federal antitrust 
enforcement.  Left unregulated, health insurance companies have the 
potential to grow so large that they can harm the market and consumers.  
This should not be the case and was not the case in the Anthem-Cigna and 
Aetna-Humana mergers, as discussed below. 
Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act in 1945 in response to 
the 1944 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Association, in which the Court determined that the federal 
government had the authority to regulate insurance companies under the 
Commerce Clause, which included antitrust regulation.72  The Act provides 
that “the business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be 
subject to the law of the several States which relate to the regulation or 
taxation of such business.”73  The McCarranFerguson Act stipulates that 
federal antitrust regulations (i.e., the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, etc.) shall apply to the business of 
insurance “to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.”74 
Under the Act, the antitrust exemption pertains to activities that “(1) 
constitute the “business of insurance,” (2) are “regulated by State law,” and 
(3) do not constitute an agreement or act to “boycott, coerce, or 
intimidate.”75 
Turning to the first element, the business of insurance is not all-
encompassing and does not include all activities of insurance companies.76  
While mergers are not considered the “business of insurance,”77 this note 
 
 72. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 546. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, 1012(a) (1988). 
 74. § 1012(b). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1013; see also Michael Cowie, Health Insurance 
and Federal Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Recent Congressional Action, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec 
2009) at 1. 
 76. Michael Cowie, Health Insurance and Federal Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Recent 
Congressional Action, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec 2009), 2. 
 77. Robert Cyran, The Regulatory Hurdles to Health Insurance Mergers, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(July 24, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/business/dealbook/the-regulatory-hurdles-to-
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focuses on Aetna and Anthem’s conduct in their pursuit of the mergers. 
Courts have typically interpreted the second criterion, regulation by State 
law, for McCarran-Ferguson exemption broadly.  However, because the 
federal government has already established through the Affordable Care 
Act that the health insurance exchanges will be largely left to the individual 
States for regulation, both Aetna and Anthem satisfy this criterion.  Thus, 
this analysis focuses on the first and third elements in each of the Aetna 
and Anthem cases. 
Finally, turning to the last criterion for antitrust exemption, an entity is 
exempt from federal antitrust liability if its conduct does not constitute an 
agreement or act to boycott, coerce, or intimidate.  By definition, a boycott 
is a refusal to deal with another in unrelated transactions in order to achieve 
terms desired in targeted transaction.78  In St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Barry, the Court concluded that the term “boycott” 
included “concerted refusals to deal with parties who were not 
competitors.79 
AETNA 
In order to determine what activities constitute the business of 
insurance under the parameters of the McCarranFerguson Act, courts 
must consider (1) whether the conduct has the effect of transferring or 
spreading a policyholder’s risk, (2) whether the conduct is an integral part 
of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured, and (3) 
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.80  
Here the conduct in question is Aetna’s withdrawal from the marketplace 
exchanges as a response to the DOJ’s suit to enjoin the merger with 
Humana. 
In this case, because Aetna is a health insurance provider, their 
conduct has the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholder’s risk.  
In other words, when policyholders contracted with Aetna for insurance, 
the policyholders’ risk was spread throughout the other Aetna 
policyholders in their risk pool.  Aetna’s withdrawal affected the coverage 
of their consumers that had policies through the marketplace exchanges by 
transferring the risk back to the individual policyholders.  Moreover, their 
conduct is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer 
and the insured because withdrawing from the exchanges directly affected 
 
health-insurance-mergers.html [https://perma.cc/2CUA-MN5W]. 
 78. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993). 
 79. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond 
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81 at 104 (1983), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/3; citing St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978). 
 80. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982). 
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Aetna’s consumers.  Aetna policyholders in those particular markets were 
left without insurance and had to seek different coverage as a result of the 
withdrawal. Aetna effectively ended their relationship with those 
policyholders.  Lastly, Aetna’s conduct is limited to entities within the 
insurance industry because the marketplace exchanges were established for 
private health insurance companies.  Therefore, Aetna’s conduct satisfies 
the first prong for McCarran-Ferguson exemption and should constitute the 
“business of insurance.” 
Turning to the third prong for McCarran-Ferguson exemption, Aetna 
withdrew from the federally established health insurance exchanges in an 
attempt to influence the Department of Justice to relent in its action against 
Aetna.  In fact, the court concluded that Aetna’s reasoning for withdrawing 
was to improve its litigation position.81  In this case, a court could consider 
Aetna’s refusal to participate in the health insurance exchanges a boycott 
against the federal government in order to achieve their desired transaction 
—a successful merger with Humana.  Moreover, Aetna’s conduct, 
including their letter to the Department of Justice, may be characterized as 
coercion or intimidation. 
Although Aetna’s conduct constitutes the “business of insurance” and 
is regulated by state law, Aetna may not be able to escape federal antitrust 
liability because their withdrawal may be considered a boycott.  Further, a 
court could consider their withdrawal, in conjunction with their letter to the 
DOJ, an attempt to coerce and intimidate the government to change its 
position on the merger. 
ANTHEM 
In contrast to Aetna, Anthem has yet to take any affirmative action, 
rendering the McCarran-Ferguson Act inapplicable.  Anthem’s political 
lobbying, although transparent, does not violate antitrust laws.  However, it 
raises concerns about the ability of major health insurance companies to 
utilize their market power to influence politics to their advantage. 
Anthem’s behavior shows that the health insurance companies, particularly 
the biggest players in the industry (i.e., Anthem, Aetna, Humana, and 
Cigna) have grown so large that they are emboldened to challenge the 
federal government and destabilize insurance markets for their own 
business gain. 
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows health insurers to try to 
avoid federal antitrust enforcement, it is not always the case. Health 
insurers cannot always escape enforcement, as was the case in both the 
Aetna and Anthem mergers.  Without any federal regulation, particularly 
 
 81. Supra note 6, at 19293. 
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antitrust regulation, health insurance companies have the ability to grow so 
large that they can completely control the marketplace.  However, antitrust 
laws like the Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and Federal Trade Commission 
Act can help combat the problem, as discussed below. 
III. ANTITRUST REGULATION 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are 
tasked with protecting competition in the marketplace through the 
enforcement of antitrust laws such as the Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and 
Federal Trade Commission Act.  These pieces of legislation allow the DOJ 
and FTC to punish anticompetitive behavior to prevent further 
consolidation of the marketplace and protect consumers.  This section 
discusses whether Aetna and Anthem’s merger conduct, specifically the 
tactics they used, violated antitrust laws. 
A.  THE CLAYTON ACT 
The Clayton Act Section 7 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that 
“may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly.”82  The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission typically enforce Section 7, although state attorneys general 
and private parties can also enforce Section 7, pursuant to Section 4 or 16 
of the Clayton Act.83  Typically, when a merger is under review, the court 
will analyze whether the challenge is appropriate under Section 7.  A 
merger is subject to challenge if it is “likely to encourage one or more firms 
to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm 
consumers.”84  HartScott Rodino filings often triggers Section 7 review.85  
Under the Hart Scott Rodino Act, parties who want to acquire another 
entity must file a detailed report to the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice prior to completing the merger or transferring any 
securities or assets if the combined assets of the two companies would 
exceed a 323 million dollar threshold.86  Here, both Aetna and Anthem’s 
respective 37 billion dollar and 52.4 billion dollar attempted mergers well 
exceeded the 323 million dollar threshold. 
In order to determine if a merger violates Section 7, courts will 
typically conduct a rule of reason analysis.  Courts will analyze and define 
the relevant markets, the companies’ market share, and if the merger will 
 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), 26. 
 84. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf. 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 18a. 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (updated as of Feb. 27, 2017). 
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result in a highly concentrated market.87  The Department of Justice 
brought suits against Aetna and Anthem for their attempted mergers and 
eventually prevailed.88  The court in both cases found that the Aetna and 
Anthem mergers would substantially lessen competition based on findings 
of market share and concentration.89  Because Section 7 was already 
addressed in detail by the courts,90 this note will not go into further detail 
regarding the mergers as they relate to the Clayton Act.  Rather, this note 
will discuss the tactics that Aetna and Anthem employed to ensure the 
success of their respective mergers and why those tactics should raise 
concerns for the government and consumers. 
B.  THE SHERMAN ACT 
The Sherman Act also regulates competition and the behavior of 
competitors in any given market.  Congress passed the Sherman Act in 
1890.91  The Act generally prohibits anticompetitive business activities:92 
Section 1 targets and prohibits specific means of anticompetitive conduct, 
whereas Section 2 focuses on results that are anticompetitive in nature.93 
Because Section 2 focuses on results, and the court already decided to 
enjoin both mergers, this note will not address Section 2.  Rather, this 
section will address Section 1 as it relates to Aetna and Anthem’s conduct. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “prohibits every contract, combination, 
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”94  In order to determine 
whether an action violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts will turn to 
the elements as follows: (1) a conspiracy or agreement, (2) which 
unreasonably restrains competition, (3) and which affects interstate 
commerce.95  Anthem pulled out of the marketplace on their own volition. 
Because there was no agreement with Cigna, the Sherman Act does not 
apply in this case.  Similarly, Aetna’s conduct does not amount to a 
conspiracy or agreement with another entity either.  Therefore, the 
Sherman Act is not applicable to both of the mergers discussed in this note. 
C. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) was created with the sole 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Supra note 6, and United States v. Anthem, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23613. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Supra note 6, and United States v. Anthem, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23613. 
 91. 15 USCA §§ 1-7. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Wex Antitrust Overview, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust 
[https://perma.cc/R4HQ-K3MS]. 
 94. 15 USCS § 1. 
 95. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 917 (1981). 
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objective to “protect the process of competition for the benefit of 
consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to 
operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.”96  The FTCA 
established the Federal Trade Commission, which granted the FTC the 
power to prohibit and prevent anti-competitive practices.97  Under the 
FTCA, “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are 
prohibited.98  The FTCA allows the Commission to “seek monetary redress 
and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers, prescribe rules defining 
with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and 
establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices,” 
among other things.99 
To determine if a practice is unfair, courts will assess if the practice 
(1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, (2) cannot 
be reasonably avoided by consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.  Courts may also 
take public policy, regulation, or judicial decisions into consideration in 
conjunction with all other evidence in making their determination.100  An 
act or practice is considered deceptive where (1) a representation, omission, 
or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer, (2) a consumer’s 
interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is considered 
reasonable under the circumstances, and (3) the misleading representation, 
omission, or practice is material.101 
This section assesses whether Aetna and Anthem’s conduct 




To reiterate, a practice is unfair if it (1) causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers, (2) cannot be reasonably avoided by 
consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.102 
Charles Gaba, founder of ACAsignups.net which extensively tracks 
 
 96. The Antitrust Laws, Fed. Trade Comm., ftc.gov (2016). 
 97. 15 USCS § 45 (1890). 
 98. 15 USCS § 45(a)(1). 
 99. Federal Trade Commission Act, FED. TRADE COMM. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/ 
statutes/federal-trade-commission-act [https://perma.cc/ZB4P-94SF]. 
 100. 15 USCS § 45(n). 
 101. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F2d 1431, 1436 (1986). 
 102. 15 USCS § 45(n). 
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ACA enrollment in detail, estimates that 600,000 Aetna policyholders will 
be affected by Aetna’s withdrawal from the exchanges.103  600,000 
previously insured Aetna policyholders will no longer have coverage, 
placing them at risk of having uncovered medical bills or being subject to a 
penalty fee per the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.104  Because 
Aetna’s withdrawal left their policyholders either without coverage, having 
to find different coverage, or having to choose an alternative coverage 
option that they had not originally contracted for, a substantial number of 
their policyholders sustained a substantial injury.  Further, while 
policyholders can arguably shop around for a different policy, Aetna 
policyholders must do so after the fact.  Because the conduct was a 
unilateral decision on Aetna’s part, its policyholders could not avoid losing 
coverage.  Thus, Aetna’s withdrawal satisfies the second element because 
consumers could not reasonably avoid the conduct.  Finally, to determine 
that Aetna’s practice was unfair, Aetna’s withdrawal must not be 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. 
Here, Aetna stated that it withdrew from the exchanges due to financial 
reasons, despite the fact that they were actually profiting in those 
markets.105  Aetna asserted that they, along with the other major payers 
have “experienced continued financial stress within their individual public 
exchange business” and that in order to provide affordable, highquality 
health care options to consumers, they need to withdraw from the 
exchanges.106  Although Aetna may benefit its consumers as a whole by 
increasing its financial solvency, withdrawing from the exchanges does not 
benefit the consumers injured by its conduct nor does it benefit 
competition.  Therefore, Aetna’s conduct constitutes an unfair practice 
under Section 5 because its withdrawal from the exchanges does not 
outweigh the countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 
Based on the analysis above, Aetna’s withdrawal from the 
marketplace exchanges constitutes an unfair practice because its 
withdrawal caused substantial injury to consumers, could not be reasonably 
avoided by consumers, and was not outweighed by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or to competition.  Given these assessments, it seems likely 
that the FTC could sustain a claim against Aetna for violation of the FTCA. 
 
 103. Charles Gaba, OK, How Many People Will HAVE to Shop Around This Fall, AFFORABLE 
CARE ACT SIGNUPS (Aug. 17, 2016), http://acasignups.net/16/08/29/update-x2-ok-how-many-people-
will-have-shop-around-fall [https://perma.cc/YUV7-RUBM]. 
 104. 26 USCS § 5000A(b)(1). 
 105. Aetna, Inc., Aetna to Narrow Individual Public Exchange Participation, Press Release (Aug. 
15, 2016), https://news.aetna.com/news-releases/aetna-to-narrow-individual-public-exchange-participa 
tion/ [https://perma.cc/NY2A-XU46]. 
 106. Id. 
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Deception 
Under the FTCA, an act or practice is considered deceptive where (1) 
a representation, omission, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the 
consumer, (2) a consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, 
or practice is considered reasonable under the circumstances, and (3) the 
misleading representation, omission, or practice is material and is likely to 
cause injury to a reasonable relying consumer.107 
While Aetna claimed that they withdrew from the exchanges due to a 
loss of profits from their participation, the court found otherwise.108  The 
court determined that Aetna threatened the Department of Justice and 
withdrew from the exchanges in order to improve the outcome of its 
merger litigation.109  In fact, Aetna withdrew from exchanges in some states 
and counties that were actually profitable, indicating that the reasons 
provided in the letter and in subsequent press releases were misleading to 
the public.110 
If evidence can be found that Aetna’s policyholders in those markets 
were mislead by Aetna’s claim, relied on it, and sustained an injury, such 
as leaving their exchange plan for a more expensive private plan because 
they thought the exchanges were failing, then the FTC may be able to 
penalize Aetna for deceptive behavior.  Otherwise, although Aetna’s 
representation may be misleading, Aetna policyholders’ loss of coverage 
cannot be traceable to their reliance on Aetna’s representation that their 
withdrawal was for financial reasons.  Rather their injury was caused by 
Aetna’s unilateral decision to withdraw.  Thus, although Aetna was 
deceptive in their motive to withdraw participation, the Section 5 deception 
practices assessment does not apply here, unless evidence can support 
otherwise. 
ANTHEM 
Anthem recently pulled out the exchanges in several states including 
Nevada, Maine, and Ohio and drastically reduced their presence in states 
like California and Georgia.111  If evidence can be found that Anthem’s 
 
 107. Supra note 101. 
 108. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 74 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 109. Id. at 82. 
 110. Id. at 74; Aetna, supra note 105. 
 111. Tami Luhby, Anthem exits more Obamacare markets, CNN MONEY (Aug. 7, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/07/news/economy/anthem-obamacare/index.html [https://perma.cc/T8 
VG-DZK3]; Pauline Bartolone, Anna Gorman; Chad Terhune, Anthem’s Retreat Leaves Californians 
With Fewer Choices, More Worries, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://khn.org/news/ 
anthems-retreat-leaves-californians-with-fewer-choices-more-worries/ [https://perma.cc/46MC-9Y5Q]; 
Dwyer Gunn, Anthem Pulls Out of Nevada’s ACA Exchanges Entirely, PACIFIC STANDARD (Aug. 7, 
2017), https://psmag.com/news/anthem-pulls-out-of-nevada-aca-exchanges [https://perma.cc/JCM5-
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withdrawals were motivated for the same reasons as Aetna’s withdrawals 
(i.e., to effectuate their merger), then the FTCA may have a case against 
Anthem. 
Anthem’s political power moves, while manipulative, are not against 
antitrust laws.  Despite Anthem’s unwillingness to relent to court decisions 
to enjoin the merger with Cigna and its lack of political transparency, the 
current antitrust laws do not have the ability to control the kind of political 
influence large corporations like Anthem can assert.  Although ultimately, 
antitrust laws served its purpose and protected consumers against the 
mergers, permissive lobbying allows for manipulation of the system, as is 
shown in this case. 
Considering the analysis above, the Federal Trade Commission should 
investigate Aetna and potentially Anthem for their unfair conduct.  In doing 
so, large health insurance companies like Aetna and Anthem will be 
deterred from using their market power and influence to harm the 
government and the consumers.  Aetna’s withdrawal from the exchanges 
has already had a significant impact on the marketplace exchanges in that it 
caused a ripple effect.  Anthem, Humana, and Cigna followed Aetna’s 
footsteps and released statements in which they said they were planning to 
pull out of the exchanges or they are at least assessing the option of doing 
so.112  The current state of the health insurance exchanges could collapse if 
this behavior is left unchecked. 
Even so, federal antitrust enforcement agencies like the FTC still 
cannot protect competition from the companies’ political lobbying tactics, 
as is demonstrated with Anthem.  This exposes a loophole for major health 
insurance companies to influence the federal government.  Because of the 
vast resources these companies havefinancial, political, or otherwise, the 
companies could drastically impact competition and like Anthem, become 
audacious enough to directly threaten the government.  Lobbying allows 
big corporations like Aetna and Anthem to reach into their deep pockets 
and essentially turn their dollars into policy, which should not be the case 
in a modern, capitalist society. 
Legislation reform can help tackle the health insurance companies 
abusing their power, both politically and in the market.  Legislators should 
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introduce stronger antitrust laws as a first line of defense, as well as stricter 
lobbying laws in order to deter companies from gaining too much power 
that they are able to manipulate the government.  However, short of 
legislation reform, another way that the federal government can address 
this lobbying loophole altogether is to overhaul the whole system and 
transition to a single payer system, which is discussed in the following 
section. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTION: SINGLE PAYER SYSTEM 
Aetna and Anthem were so intent on effectuating their mergers that 
both companies were willing to use any means necessary to ensure success.  
Although their attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, their conduct 
demonstrated that political lobbying can be a powerful and potentially 
dangerous tool for major health insurance companies to manipulate the 
executive branch and subvert existing judicial oversight.  Our current 
capitalist health insurance system depends on competition.  When major 
health insurance companies use their market power as political lobbying 
power to promote anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, it doubly 
threatens competition.  However, a singlepayer system could all but 
eliminate the health insurance companies’ ability to engage in conduct like 
that of Aetna and Anthem’s as well as provide a major benefit to 
consumersactual coverage. 
Prior to the ACA, 32 out of 33 developed nations had universal health 
care, with the United States being the one exception.113  The 
implementation of the ACA changed that by introducing the individual 
mandate.  Even with the individual mandate, eleven percent of U.S. adults 
remain uninsured.114  With the increasing complexities and political 
uncertainty surrounding the health care system in the United States, the 
once impossible singlepayer system, now seems politically viable.  A 
singlepayer system is a system in which “the governmentnot the 
employercollects the health insurance premiums of all Americans in the 
form of payroll or income taxes.”115  The money goes into a health security 
trust fund established by the federal government and then distributed to the 
states.116  Each state then pays health care providers directly (i.e., hospitals, 
 
 113. List of Countries with Universal Healthcare (Feb. 8, 2018), https://truecostblog.com/2009/08/ 
09/countries-with-universal-healthcare-by-date/#link1 [https://perma.cc/JHY8-52NT]. 
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physicians, etc.) for their services.117  Payments can be made in various 
ways: fee for service, bundled payment, episodic payment, capitated 
payment, payment for value, to name a few.  In a single payer system the 
federal or state government can negotiate payments for services, or the 
government can contract with outside entities for the healthcare services 
like Canada does.118  In some instances, the single payer model has 
transformed into socialized medical care, where the government employs, 
establishes, and operates their own doctors and hospitals, similar to the 
system in the United Kingdom,119 but this need not be the case in the 
United States.  The two do not go hand-in-hand. 
Successful single payer models have shown that it is possible for a 
country to have inexpensive, reliable healthcare for all that does not 
bankrupt the economy.120  For example, Thailand’s healthcare system is 
notably one of the most successful implementations of a singlepayer 
system to date.  In 2000, Thailand was in a healthcare crisis.121  Roughly a 
quarter of Thailand’s population was uninsured, and several of the insured 
had inadequate policies.122  An estimated twenty percent of the poorest Thai 
homes became impoverished as a result of out-of-pocket healthcare 
spending.123  The following year, Thailand introduced “one of the most 
ambitious healthcare reforms ever undertaken in a developing country.”124 
Ten years later, ninty eight percent of the population, about forty-eight  
million Thai people, had insurance.125  Since the program’s 
implementation, Thailand’s mortality rates significantly dropped, and life 
expectancy has increased.126  The program improved health outcomes for 
millions of Thai people at the cost of $80 per person annually.127  This is a 
stark contrast from the over $10,000 spent per person in the United 
States.128 
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Single payer models can also be successful in developed countries as 
well.  An example of a successful single payer system in the developed 
country is Taiwan.  In 1995, Taiwan adopted a National Health Insurance 
(NHI) system.129  Prior to its implementation, roughly fifty-seven percent of 
the Taiwanese population was insured by a number of health insurers.130 
Per Taiwan’s NHI, every Taiwanese citizen has an identification card, and 
it includes a brief medical history.131  Each person must bring their card 
every time they utilize a medical service.132  The card allows hospitals to 
claim the charges, tracked by the cards, from the government.133  This 
system enables rapid claims processing for healthcare providers.134 
Although the program is government-run, Taiwan relies on private 
healthcare providers for healthcare services.  Thus, health care providers 
still compete for patients.  Some of the strengths of Taiwan’s NHI include 
good accessibility, comprehensive coverage, short waiting times, low cost, 
high coverage rate, and a nationwide research databank, which allows the 
government to conduct research to track public health outcomes.135 
However, some of the weaknesses of Taiwan’s NHI include reduced 
quality of outpatient visits and a shortage of funding.136  Because of the 
programs convenience and affordability, coupled with “a high level of 
health seeking behavior” in Taiwan, general practitioners often see above 
average numbers of patients each day.137  This results in extremely short 
consultation times, typically no more than five minutes of physician time, 
which in turn leads to a decrease in quality because physicians are unable 
to spend quality time to assess the patient’s needs.138  Regardless, the NHI 
consistently receives satisfaction rates about seventy percent, and the 
Taiwanese have improved health outcomes.139  Moreover, Taiwan’s health 
care system costs about $2,595 per capita and covers 99.9% of its 
population, which is considerably different from the United States for both 
metrics.140 
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A pure single payer system would eliminate the political abuses and 
market manipulations outlined in this note.  Without private health 
insurance companies, the government is solely accountable for the health 
insurance of its citizens.  Consequentially, healthcare providers would be 
forced to improve costs and exceed quality measures in order to compete 
for better reimbursement rates from the government.  However, a pure 
single payer system is difficult to accomplish, considering the highly 
polarized political environment in the United States currently.  Some 
countries, such as Australia, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have 
hybrid systems.141  These hybrids allow people the option of choosing a 
private health insurer if they do not want to opt into the government 
system, otherwise known as a public option.  In this type of system, the 
private health insurers must compete with the government-run plans.  A 
hybrid model may be the most viable option for the United States going 
forward, and health insurance companies would have to truly improve costs 
and quality to bolster competition, which would benefit the consumers.  A 
hybrid model will also take away much of the political power and influence 
that major health insurance companies have, which will benefit and protect 
consumers from political gaming.  While the single payer system is not 
without its flaws, there are relatively successful models in both developed 
and developing countries that can offer the United States some guidance. 
Further, it can look to the Medicare system, a semi-single payer system that 
already exists in the United States for individuals who are 65 and older, in 
which taxpayers pay for a large majority while private entities pay some 
parts.142  The U.S. government can use Medicare as a guide to expand the 
covered population.  With several existing single payer models to look to, 
the United States should consider transitioning to a single payer system, or 
a hybrid form of it, to deter major health insurance companies from using 
their power to harm consumers. 
Although there are several benefits and positive examples of single 
payer systems, there are some issues to consider.  A main issue regarding 
single payer systems is solvency.  In the Taiwanese model and the 
Medicare model, controlling the overall budget poses a problem for the 
government.  The Taiwanese have had to cut into other government funds 
to pay for their citizens’ healthcare, and funding for Medicare is predicted 
to run out in 2028.143  Spending can often exceed what is collected from the 
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people by the government. This is an issue that has yet to be resolved. 
Solvency aside, the U.S. should still consider transitioning to a hybrid 
single payer and private insurer hybrid because the current private 
insurance model is becoming increasingly costly and burdensome to 
consumers and is likely going to continue to be so due to the rapid 
consolidation nature of the industry. Further, doing so would allow the 
government to reign in the health insurance companies’ ability to use their 
market power and political influence against it because it would shift some 
control back to the government. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of antitrust regulation should be to ensure the conditions of a 
free market and to protect competition in the marketplace.144  With the 
health care industry transitioning to a highly capitalized and monetized 
environment, antitrust regulation is becoming increasingly important. 
Without safeguards in place, health insurance companies have the potential 
to destroy competition in the marketplace, which ultimately harms the 
consumers.  While the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission share the authority to sue to enjoin mega-mergers like the 
Aetna-Humana and Anthem-Cigna mergers and stop them from 
effectuating, the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to investigate 
and prohibit corporations from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices 
that are oftentimes used as means to succeed in their merger pursuits.  The 
Federal Trade Commission should exercise their authority to protect the 
process of competition and to prevent large corporations from becoming 
bad actors just so they can succeed.  These practices can lead to 
catastrophic consequences, as we are beginning to see with the marketplace 
exchanges. 
Alternatively, those issues can be resolved if the government can 
move toward a single payer system or a hybrid system.  While not entirely 
perfect, a single payer system would all but eliminate the negative 
behaviors discussed in this note.  A hybrid system would be a viable option 
for the government to explore because it still allows for competition in the 
health insurance market, but it also allows the government to set the 
industry standard to reign in bad behavior. 
Regardless, the health insurance industry is likely to continue to see 
changes and transform, whether it be from political forces or shifts in the 
market.  The outcome of which is unknown.  It is crucial that the U.S. 
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government take steps in order to ensure the health of its citizens and 
continue to make strides to achieve healthcare for all and not allow big 
health insurance companies to use their market power as political power to 
coerce the government or harm competition or the consumers. 
 
